V.J. Chalupa

On Post-Modern Politics

ANNEX: UNDERSTANDING CREATION

Order  in Chaos

No man elects to exist; each is propelled into this cosmos of insanely whirling invisible particles which assault him forcing him to discover, project and create order from their apparent chaos through the use of his spiritual faculties, unrational ones (intuition, parapsychology, mysticism, faith capable to accept revelation) and reason, rationality. To survive, man sorts out of the the ever changing universe units each consisting of its own temporarily steady pattern, its own whole, and identifies each such unit by a symbol.

Each such unit, whether animate or inanimate, whether human or non-human,  is a whole, a completeness formed by its source of cohesion, the factor which binds certain phenomena together and thus makes them the whole's parts. The source of cohesion is either similarity (its parts exhibit identical properties) or complementarity (its dissimilar parts are interconnected in a functional order, a system of relationships). It is a logical error to identify the whole with its parts, or rather: to reduce the whole to its parts: a whole consists of, or better, subsists in its parts, but it has a reality of its own. A forest can be mentally reduced to trees, shrubs, mushrooms, soil, etc., nevertheless, a forest is a real object in its own right. A group of people assembled for prayer is a congregation; the same group of people assembled for rioting is a mob; although they both consist of the same parts, there exist two different units: a congregation and a mob, depending on its source of cohesion.

Parts of a whole based on complementarity are components of various properties arranged in a certain order; without the completeness and the proper relationships of its components, the whole does not exist. The components of a whole based on complementarity are not interchangeable and are therefore not quantifiable. The emphasis is equally on the differences of the components and on their ordering. A whole of this type provides usually for "spares" of its components, i.e., the existence of parts which could in case of need replace parts acting as the whole's specialized components  -- cf. the U.S. Constitution's provisions of filling the function of the President by consecutive replacements in case of need.)

The whole based on similarity is the totality of parts of the same property or properties and their other qualities are irrelevant for their belonging to the whole and are disregarded, abstracted. Such parts are portions of the whole; they are interchangeable, they are statistical units whose individual differences are not,  or do not have to be, taken into account: the emphasis is on their uniformity.As far as people are concerned, grouping them into a whole on the basis of similarity is unavoidable (even if it can be mitigated) when dealing with numerically large groups ("masses"); it is the approach of the state towards its citizens, the army towards soldiers, and also of marketing towards potential customers, of political propaganda towards potential supporters, and in general of all bureaucracies towards their respective objects of care. "Sacrificing" a number of its portions in the interest of the whole has always been accepted practice (cf. Gen.Eisenhower's calculations of losses expected during the invasion of Europe). Similarity as the source of cohesion may originate from man's nature as a social being or be based on identical reactions of several other individuals. In the first instance, the group with which he identifies, is given independently of his will (gender, race, nationality, citizenship, religion), in the second instance,the identification of an individual with a group may be conscious or subconscious, originating from suppressed impulses changed into complexes.

Certain kinds of whole are ambivalent; they exhibit the characteristics and the behavior of both types.  An apple can be cut up into halves, quarters, and still smaller portions interchangeable and quantifiable; their total represents the whole called "apple;" the apple is also a whole consisting of seeds, body, skin and stem; only if all are combined in the proper order, is there a whole, an apple.

Each whole is registered by the mind with a symbol. Thinking extracts from  experience relatively stable sections (objects) and their changes (processes) and creates knowledge.Symbols formed by mental processes as ideas or concepts are expressed by words and communicated by sight, hearing and touch, although words are not identical with the mental symbols. Reasoning forms a wonderful, flexible, extensive and internally linked conceptual order or network which captures, reflects and organizes the infinitely varied and mutable experience of the being.

Examination of knowledge is possible in two ways: analysis of thinking, i.e., the thinker (psychology) or analysis of the result of thinking (logic). The object analyzed by logic is clear, exact, firmly recorded (mostly in writing) and therefore invariable. Psychology is unable to follow exactly the processes in human brain; its object of research is in continuous flow, and thus elusive. Therefore, the most suitable approach for  the examination of politics is the use of reason in its most refined form of logic, science, because -- contrary to unrational approaches  -- its results are objectively communicable, because it proceeds according to verifiable and generally valid rules, and because these qualities make possible cooperation in the search for truth spanning time and space. Logic concludes that there is an author of thinking, a subject of reason, because there are evidently and undisputable the results produced by him; the structure of knowledge are his properties, and such properties equally evident and undisputable, are properties relevant to this logically necessary subject of reason.

Among the judgments linking the ideas in the conceptual network a special category consists of judgments which explain one concept by means of another concept or concepts. Such judgments are explanations, i.e., answers to the question "why," and there are two and only two explanatory principles: necessity and freedom consisting of reason and volition. When explanation of an idea by necessity as an effect of a cause is impossible or unsatisfactory, the being of the given idea is explained as the result of an action.  Action must not be confused with activity; activity is a reaction to causes; all live beings evidence activity, animals as well as plants. Action is the result of freedom, i.e., of choice (reasoning) and will. In the world, only mankind is capable of action either as individuals or as organizations. In instances where this subject of freedom coincides with a human being, his supreme (highest) purpose from which all other purposes are derived, is the purpose of personal subjective satisfaction, of happiness.  People act in order to be satisfied. Empirically, man appears to be a being which evidences reason and will for the purpose of achieving satisfaction: man acts in the manner he acts because, after evaluation of all possibilities he selects one as the most satisfactory. Thus, satisfaction ("happiness") is the goal for which all human beings strive.

Explanation of being in terms of freedom generates principles for comprehending and arranging phenomena  as not simply existing, but as wanted (by someone), as postulates. The basic question in this manner of explaining observed phenomena is: why is the object of observation wanted? The explanation is: because something else is wanted. The investigated object is demanded because it is a means toward another postulate, the end, or the object is recognized as a demanded purpose because other objects are wanted as means for its attainment. The method of this manner of comprehension and explanation is finality (or teleology) to distinguish it from the comprehension and explanation by necessity (causality or ontology).

Necessity as the explanatory principle leads logically to certain conclusions; the two basic ones are: everything that exists is the effect of a cause and is in turn the cause having another effect and so on; the sequence of such cause--effects form a causal chain of necessary phenomena.

Logic produces from freedom as an explanatory principle another system of conclusions creating chains of purposes and means. Because politics' explanation demands freedom of reasoning and willing subjects, a more detailed description of this logical system is beneficial for the understanding of politics.

The two poles of action are purpose and means, purpose (goal) being demanded objects to whose attainment are demanded means; and means are objects demanded for the attainment of purposes.

About goals

Classified by duration,  purposes (goals) are either

one-time (those that once fulfilled, disappear from the world of postulates (if driving a nail is the purpose, once the nail is driven, the purpose ceases to exist), or

repetitive (those that reappear regularly after having been fulfilled (if eating is the purpose, it reappears repeatedly after each fulfillment), or

permanent (those that remain demanded regardless of fulfillment: if the purpose is obedience to the law, it remains a postulate no matter how often the law is obeyed).

Classified by contents, goals are:

simple (one object is wanted: to reach a destination),

complex (the purpose consists of two or more objectives: to construct the lightest, strongest and cheapest bridge),

declining (they can be satisfied gradually with the intensity of want diminishing with each partial fulfillment: eating -- the first loaf of bread conveys greater satisfaction than the second, and so on in diminishing utility),

maximum (the content of the purpose is wanted in the largest possible quantity: earning money, accumulating power) or

optimum (a complex goal wanted in maximum quantity).

An end which is not a means towards another end is the original, the primary purpose; the means towards its attainment that require the attainment of other, subordinated means, are intermediate, derived purposes. The original purpose therefore generates a pyramid of hierarchically arranged postulates at whose apex is the primary end/purpose supported by secondary, tertiary etc. derived purposes as means to attain the means closer to the original postulate, i.e., higher in the hierarchy of means. In complex goals, the sundry required qualities function as secondary goals; they are joined together by the extent in which they are implemented. This relationship constitutes the material solidarity among them and is the source of unity of the primary purpose.

About means

A good is a useful object; usefulness is the set of qualities enabling it to attain the purpose. Usefulness depends on the nature of the purpose and does not include all of the good's qualities; actually, some of them may even be harmful, have "side effects." Harmfulness, the opposite of usefulness, is a quality or qualities of an object enabling it to delay, diminish or prevent the attainment of the purpose.

The means capable of attaining the purpose (in full or in part) generates utility; utility is the full or partial achievement of the goal. Utility is attributed to the means, but means in themselves have no utility; only actions of using them properly create utility. (Medication is useful, but does not generate utility until it is properly used for a purpose; this purpose may be health, but it also might be suicide.)

Usefulness of one and the same object may vary according the use it is put to. The same piece of wood may be, according to the various purposes it is used for, fuel (heat), tool (lever), club (weapon), crutch or walking stick (.support).  All these goods (fuel, tool, club, crutch or walking stick) are one and the same object; they are not five objects; they remain the same existentially (ontologically), but become different objects according to the end for which they are used. Direct usefulness of a good is a natural (ontological) characteristic that describes its ability to attain a special technically definable purpose. Indirect usefulness is a capacity to obtain directly useful means; the most common type of indirectly useful means is money. Indirect usefulness can be concrete (it can be a means of obtaining only a certain good or type of goods  -- a food coupon can obtain only food) or abstract (money can obtain a wide selection of goods).

The usefulness of means is activated by their utilization. By utilization, some means remain unchanged, some are diminished in their usefulness (they are subject to wear) and some lose it entirely (they are consumed).

Under purposes whose content is declining,  subsequent means yield a declining utility while their usefulness remains unchanged. If the means can be quantified, i.e., expressed in units, the decline of utility can be also quantified, mathematically identified and expressed in the form of a declining line or curve, until it reaches zero. The utility per unit is the relative utility of the means in question. The last unit that yields some utility is the marginal one.

Under complex purposes, the declining lines of utility under its secondary purposes are different; some decline faster than others. To obtain the maximum fulfillment of the primary goal, the utilization must shift from one line to another according to the amount of relative utility, i.e., the utility that can be obtained from its individual units.  

If obtaining or utilizing a useful means is connected with incurring harm under the same goal, the action is good only if the utility outweighs the harm. The harm incurred by obtaining a higher utility is its cost, the excess of utility over harm is return (gain).  If the utility can be quantified, so can the cost; the cost related to a unit of the means is its relative cost. The tendency of relative cost can be depicted by a line or a descending or ascending curve (this latest is obvious especially concerning taxation). When this curve intersects the curve of declining usefulness, further obtaining of this particular means becomes counterproductive. Procuring goods whose cost exceeds their utility is wrong. Maximum gain is obtained by utilizing means according to the extent of their relative returns -- this is a basic principle of purposive thinking, the principle of economy in acquisition and utilization of goods (= useful objects).

Norm and Duty

Freedom is also the explanation of the relations between the phenomena connected by the following answers to the questions: Why  is there a duty? "Because there is a norm." and Why is there a norm? "Because it is a means to attain a purpose." The act of issuing a norm is the result of free reasoning and will on the part of the normgiver; on the part of the subject of duty, the duty is supposed to be fulfilled, but the subject of duty is free to disobey it. The closeness between the relationships purpose-norm and means-duty is reflected by the similarity between qualities of norms and of goals listed above under the paragraph "About Goals." Norms result in similar hierarchical pyramids of higher and lower norms as do purposes in hierarchies of purposes and means, with one basic difference: while lower-level means/purposes are derived from higher levels by measures of usefulness, lower-level norms/duties are derived from higher levels by logic only. A lower level norm is valid, because the higher norm is valid and is derived logically from  the highest, primary norm. The validity of the highest form is based either on the rational, charismatic or traditional authority or on the power of the normgiver,  whichever is accepted by the subject of duty.