V.J. Chalupa

On Post-Modern Politics

PART B. OBJECTIVE CRITERIA

 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS

CHAPTER 15

ACHIEVING A PURPOSE

Action originates from the discrepancy between the idea of how man would like the world to be, and the reality of how the world is; action is the effort to bring reality in accordance with the vision of how it is willed to be. The vision, the willed objective, the contents of volition is the acting subject's purpose.

The nature of a purpose is to be achieved (attained, implemented), but its implementation is not inevitable; were it inevitable, it would not be an action, but a law of nature. Its achievement consists in the transformation of a phenomenon (phenomenon = what can be observed) being only willed (wanted) into one also being real, existing. Existence, reality is understood to be a necessary sequence of causes and effects. If the subject of volition wants to change reality to conform to his idea of how reality should be, he must first identify the chain or chains of causes and effects which result in the existence of the willed objective, of the purpose, and if there appear to be several such chains, he chooses the one which achieves the purpose in the most economical way; then he must start the selected chain of causes and effects. The purpose does not indicate this chain; therefore the realization of a purpose depends on three factors: (a) such causal chain must exist, (b) the subject of volition must find it, and (c) he must trigger the chain by creating its cause through his action. Therefore, it must be assumed that the subject of volition possesses not only freedom (will) to act or not to act, but also reason (intelligence) to know how to act.

The process of transforming a willed objective into reality consists in the utilization of a suitable means, a means being an objective willed for its ability to achieve a purpose. The realization of a purpose therefore consists in selecting a suitable means and of utilizing it. The property of a means to be suitable of achieving a given purpose is its usefulness; a means is useful if it has among its qualities a set of causes among whose effects is the willed objective, the purpose. The means, however, by itself does not achieve the purpose; it must be utilized, i.e. set in motion, initiated by the subject of will; the subject which originated the purpose must, first, by reason select the means, and, by free will, cause the chain of effects-causes to start. The selection and utilization of means is an action attributable to an intelligent and free agent and is an integral part of the explanation of phenomena by the principle of freedom. It is distinct from activity  which is an effect of causes and is attributed to animate and non-animate objects as well as intelligent beings insofar as it is considered to be a necessary sequence of a cause (its effect).

The achievement of a purpose takes place between two poles: the purpose and the means, and depends on the nature of both.  The investigation whether a purpose is achievable or whether a means is useful is the investigation whether the contents of a purpose do not violate the nature ("laws") of the universe - in which case it is not achievable - or if means are capable of achieving the desired end - if they initiate the causal sequence whose effect is the realization of a given purpose's contents. This investigation may be based either on a revealed truth and its norms or on the analysis of reality, of existence, its nature and its "laws".  Were this study addressed only to believers in revelation, it would be sufficient to judge purposes and means from the tenets of such revelation, revelation being a direct communication from a metaphysical being to man. Because this study is addressed to all readers, not only to believers in revelation, the study will proceed on the basis of examination of "natural laws" whose validity can be proven empirically to rational creatures. To such it can be convincing; to those who do not accept such basis, it is either superfluous (if they claim superior knowledge -- some supernatural insight or natural superiority) or irrelevant (if they reject rationality -- deny the possibility of discovering objective truth). Its approach has nevertheless one advantage: it at least allows communications between all persons interested in its object also across the gaps of time: with past thinkers and actors.

Achievability of a purpose and usefulness of a means are objective criteria of any purposive action.

The ability of a means to initiate the causal chain resulting in the purpose constitutes its suitability. The acting subject examines the suitability of means, assigns to them accordingly usefulness and selects the most useful. He can be mistaken in his choice - the selected means is unsuitable, it does not result in the desired reality, and is therefore useless. Because causal chains proceed in time, their uselessness must not be immediately evident. The more complicated the causal chains are, the more difficult it is to determine in advance whether they are suitable or not. The changes of human communities which are the purpose of politics, are very complex and are affected by other, not wanted and independent processes whose effects the subject of volition either ignored or underestimated, but which appear sooner or later. (Brezhnev probably died believing that communism is sure to win; in reality, it was beginning to collapse.)

The unsuitability of means is reflected on the purpose. Achievability of a purpose is its quality that the purpose's contents are a link in a causal chain. If a suitable means is unavailable, the purpose is unachievable. The nature of the purpose may be such that it is outside of the scope of effects caused by the utilization of the means; the purpose may be impossible to achieve. This impossibility may be relative or absolute.

The necessary means may not be available because the acting subject does not know of its existence: either his knowledge is limited or the knowledge of mankind has not (yet) discovered the chain of reactions resulting in the desired objective. (Prior to certain discoveries in physics, the purpose of landing a man on the Moon was unachievable. Prior to the discovery of antibiotics, the purpose of curing certain diseases was unachievable.) The other type of of relative unachievability occurs when the means of achieving the purpose are known, but out of the reach of the acting object. (In politics, the most common example is the impossibility of achieving a desired objective because of lack of necessary finances. For a non-industrialized state it is impossible to achieve space flight because it lacks the means to do it as well as the means of obtaining the needed means.)

Instances of absolute unachievability are purposes for which there is no causal chain that would include the desired effect, because the purposes in themselves are against the very nature of reality, against the very fabric of the universe. This creates a seeming paradox: as the knowledge of existence progresses, newly discovered laws of nature narrow down the scope of achievable purposes and grip man between the pincers of necessity, yet simultaneously the growth of knowledge discloses new causal chains available to man, thus increases the scope of achievable purposes and widens human freedom.

There is another aspect important specifically for politics. It is in the nature of a purpose that it should be achieved, i.e., the subject of volition who conceived the purpose, has simultaneously created an autonomous norm whose subject of duty he is himself. However, all that has been said above about the achievability of a purpose and suitability of means applies also, if the goal of a "better world" (= betterment of the conditions of a group of people) has been imposed on him from the outside, i;.e., by a heteronomous norm (in politics by a legal norm -- a law, regulation, sentence). If the subject of volition who conceived the purpose as an autonomous norm, imposes its contents on other subjects of volition, he assumes the role of a normgiver and transforms his autonomous norm into duty for others. These other subjects as subjects of duty incorporate the contents of duty into their own purposive systems as a secondary purpose and become thus for the normgiver means towards the achievement of the his purpose. They may be a most suitable means, however, due to the freedom of man, they also are a means that is highly unreliable.